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Poland held the ﬁrst round of its presidential election on 10 May. As Aleks Szczerbiak writes, one of
the key stories from the vote was the success of Paweł Kukiz, a former rock singer and political
novice who ﬁnished a surprising third with more than a ﬁfth of the vote. He notes that while the odds
are that this will generate another short-lived protest movement, the support for Kukiz tapped into
deeper underlying concerns about the functioning of the Polish political system.
There were two major surprises in the ﬁrst round of the Polish presidential election held on 10 May.
Incumbent and odds-on favourite Bronisław Komorowski, supported by the ruling centrist Civic
Platform (PO), was beaten into second place by Andrzej Duda, the candidate of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS)
party, the main opposition grouping, losing by 33.8 per cent to 34.8 per cent.
He now faces Mr Duda in a second round on 24 May and, although the outcome is diﬃcult to predict, the challenger
clearly has the strongest momentum. The other surprise was the stunning success of charismatic social activist and
former rock star Paweł Kukiz. In spite of being a relative political novice (he has been a regional councillor since last
autumn) and with no party or organised political grouping supporting his candidacy, he ﬁnished a very strong third
with 20.8 per cent the vote.
Mr Kukiz stood as an independent ‘anti-system’ candidate. His background is as a rebellious rock singer who
performed in a band called ‘The Breasts’, best known for their 1992 anti-clerical song ‘The ZChN (Christian-National
Union) is coming’. The now-defunct Christian-National Union was a clerical-nationalist party which, as a member of
Polish governments in the 1990s, promoted the Catholic Church’s social and political agenda. However, Mr Kukiz
also professes a strong commitment to the Catholic faith, arguing that his best known composition was motivated by
a desire to protect the Church from abuse by exploitative clerics.
Indeed, in recent years he has been better-known as an advocate of social conservative and patriotic causes. In
2010 Mr Kukiz opposed a ‘EuroPride’ homosexual march in Warsaw and was dismissive of the election in 2011 of
Anna Grodzka, Poland’s ﬁrst transsexual parliamentary deputy, as the product of identity politics rather than ability.
His musical recordings have also increasingly emphasised national-patriotic themes and he was at one time
involved in supporting the annual ‘Independence March’ held on 11 November, the day that Poles celebrate national
independence, which has come to be associated with nationalist groupings. However, describing himself as ‘a right-
winger with a left-wing heart’, Mr Kukiz also has a very eclectic approach towards socio-economic policy: supporting
low taxes while positing an active role for the state in tackling poverty, and enjoying close links with a number of
prominent trade union activists and leaders.
Opening up the political system
In fact, Mr Kukiz supported Civic Platform in the 2005 and 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections, although
he now refers to it as a ‘party of swindlers’ following its failure to introduce UK-style single member electoral
constituencies (known by the Polish acronym ‘JOW’), at one time a key element of the party’s programme. Indeed,
Mr Kukiz’s strong support for the replacement of Poland’s list-based proportional electoral system with ﬁrst-past-the-
post is his signature issue and was the main focus of his presidential campaign and earlier social activism.
Like many on the Polish right, Mr Kukiz argues that politics and the economy in post-communist Poland are
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dominated by networks whose power stems from the
1989 round table agreement, the elite bargain that led
to the collapse of the previous communist regime.
This facilitated a peaceful transition to democracy but
also prevented a comprehensive reckoning with the
communist past thereby allowing a corrupt oligarchy
and political class to enrich itself and entrench its
power.
According to Mr Kukiz, as a consequence of the
proportional electoral system that was introduced
after 1989, the country is governed by a ‘partocracy’:
a cartel of hierarchical political parties dominated by
leaders who dictate which candidates appear on
electoral lists. This has created a closed political
system in which the electoral process is a pure
formality, leaving the country weakened and
vulnerable to manipulation by external powers.
The aim of introducing single member constituencies is to create a system in which citizens by-pass these leaders
by voting for individual candidates rather than parties, thereby holding their elected representatives directly
accountable. This, he argues, facilitates the creation of less hierarchical parties that function as non-ideological
associative groupingsin which individuals debate openly and collaborate for the common good, and where the
leader is a ‘manager’ who attempts to ﬁnd consensus between the various currents of opinion.
In fact, although Mr Kukiz sees the introduction of single member constituencies, together with the abolition of state
party funding, as critical for changing the relationship between the government and its citizens, it is really a slogan
around which he can mobilise a broad and heterogeneous movement to open up and renew the Polish political
system more generally.
A repository for young protest voters
Mr Kukiz performed strongly, in spite of the fact that he could not draw upon the resources and organisational
infrastructure enjoyed by the main candidates, because he was able to mobilise a substantial segment of Polish
society who believe that post-1989 Poland has produced a privileged and complacent ruling elite who are only
interested in protecting their own interests.
Lacking faith in the current political system, these people appear to be looking for new leaders who, like Mr Kukiz,
are more genuine and sincere than the current crop of cynical and calculating career politicians, even if their policies
and programmes are not particularly coherent or well thought-through. Moreover, while his ‘wild’ rock star past, and
ability to connect with ordinary voters and articulate genuine anger at the perceived dysfunctionality of the political
system, burnished his anti-system credentials, Mr Kukiz was also able to portray a more moderate image than other
protest candidates.
In fact, Mr Kukiz’s electorate is very diverse, other than the fact that he won the largest share of the vote among
students (40.3 per cent) and younger voters (41.4 per cent, compared with only 3.8 per cent among the over-60s). A
large number of young Poles are frustrated at an apparent ‘glass ceiling’ of vested interests and corrupt networks
stiﬂing their opportunities, and often face an invidious choice between moving abroad to take jobs that fall well short
of their abilities and aspirations or remaining in a country which they feel oﬀers them few prospects for the future.
Mr Kukiz was clearly able to tap into this frustration. Indeed, one of his arguments for single member constituencies
was that it could facilitate the kind of state action required to prevent millions of Poles being forced to emigrate in
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order to ﬁnd work, a process which he described graphically as the ‘extermination of the nation’, pointing out that
many of them had moved to the UK which has a ﬁrst-past-the-post electoral system.
What impact will Mr Kukiz have?
As we lack detailed analysis of Mr Kukiz’s electorate, it is diﬃcult to predict whom they will support in the second
round run-oﬀ. Given that they appeared to be motivated by a desire to see political change rather than continuity,
one might expect them to support Mr Duda as the challenger. Moreover, while Mr Kukiz has not openly endorsed
either candidate, he made it clear in the past that he did not want to see Mr Komorowski re-elected.
However, many of Mr Kukiz’s voters are otherwise disengaged from the political process – 41.8 per cent of those
who did not vote in the previous 2010 presidential election supported him as did 46.8 per cent who abstained in the
most recent 2011 parliamentary election – so a large proportion of them are unlikely to vote at all in the second
round. Moreover, they also include former Civic Platform sympathisers – Mr Kukiz secured 17.3 per cent of Mr
Komorowski’s 2010 voters and 15.1 per cent of those who supported the ruling party in 2011 – who may simply have
wanted to register a protest vote against the government or were put oﬀ by the President’s weak and complacent
campaign.
Many of these may return to the fold when faced with the prospect of a Law and Justice-backed candidate being
elected President. Indeed, in an eﬀort to win over his supporters, the day after the ﬁrst round results were
announced Mr Komorowski promised to initiate a national referendum on introducing single-member constituencies
(together with the abolition of state party funding), although Mr Kukiz immediately questioned the authenticity of this
move.
Looking beyond the presidential election, the substantial vote for an anti-system candidate like Mr Kukiz shows that
the potential protest electorate in Poland is very large. But will his presidential success be a ﬂash-in-the-pan or can
he use this momentum to build a new political movement that can achieve success in the more critical autumn
parliamentary election? While it is possible, as a one-oﬀ, to mobilise a frustrated electorate to cast a protest vote, in
order to hold on to his support Mr Kukiz will have to develop a political machine with at least a minimum level of
organisational infrastructure, funding and professionalism.
This is less of a problem for one candidate standing in a presidential campaign. Mr Kukiz’s charisma and high media
proﬁle attracted crowds and generated news coverage, and he was able to develop a rudimentary election machine
through a volunteer network based on his pro-electoral reform civic movement, social media and crowdfunding. To
contest a parliamentary election he will have to build up political structures that can identify hundreds of local
candidates across the whole country and develop grassroots local organisation to campaign on their behalf, all
within the space of a few months.
In fact, unless Mr Kukiz proceeds to make a series of spectacular blunders, his stunning presidential election
success should give him enough political capital to sustain his support into the autumn election, if not necessarily
through the subsequent parliamentary term. Moreover, if a substantial ‘anti-system’ right-wing bloc clustered around
Mr Kukiz enters the new parliament, this could radically alter possible future coalition conﬁgurations.
Opinion polls suggest that the two main parties are running neck-and-neck and it is unlikely that either of them will
secure an outright majority, so the key to who governs after the next election is likely to be which of them has the
greatest coalition potential. Up until now, Law and Justice appeared to have no obvious partners among the main
parliamentary groupings which meant that, even if it ‘won’ the election, Civic Platform could still end up remaining in
power. However, if Mr Kukiz’s success acts as a precursor to a strong electoral performance by the ‘anti-system’
right this could open up a pathway to power for a Law and Justice-led coalition.
Another false dawn?
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Mr Kukiz is the latest in a long line of anti-establishment candidates and parties in post-1989 Poland who have been
able to garner the support of protest voters. All of them have found it diﬃcult to maintain their support and, sooner-or-
later, faded from the political scene. The real test for anti-establishment political movements is, of course, whether
they can hold on to their protest electorate if they ever happen to ﬁnd themselves in power.
Indeed, in the past Law and Justice skilfully marginalised its radical coalition partners and then absorbed much of
their electorate. So even if he can sustain his presidential election momentum long enough to secure parliamentary
representation, this will just be the beginning of the political challenges that Mr Kukiz faces. However, while the
‘Kukiz phenomenon’ may just ﬁzzle out like previous anti-establishment challenges, the broader social trends that
he has tapped into and have formed the basis for his protest movement’s success are likely to remain a longer-
lasting feature of the Polish political scene.
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Note: This article originally appeared on Aleks Szczerbiak’s personal blog and gives the views of the author, and not
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